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CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR
TUITION, TRANSPORTATION, AND TEXTBOOK EXPENDI-
TURES MADE BY PARENTS OF CHILDREN ATTENDING
PUBLIC AND NONPUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS ARE NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.
Ct. 3062 (1983).
A Minnesota statute permits taxpayers to deduct from gross in-
come their dependents' tuition, textbook, and transportation expenses
when computing their state income taxes.' The deduction is available
to parents whose children attend public or private elementary and sec-
ondary schools located in a five-state area.2 Minnesota taxpayers
brought suit in federal district court challenging the statute as violative
of the free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment to
the Constitution.' The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendant,4 and on appeal the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed.5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve a circuit conflict 6 and to determine the constitutionality of tax
deductions for tuition expenses.' The Court upheld the Eighth Cir-
1. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09(22) (West Supp. 1983). The statute provides for the
following deductions from gross income:
The amount the taxpayer has paid to others, not to exceed $500 for each
dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in grades 7 to
12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in at-
tending an elementary or secondary school . . . which is not operated
for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1974 and chapter 363 [footnote omitted].
2. Id.
3. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 999 (D. Minn. 1981), affd, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th
Cir. 1982), a]T'd, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). The first amendment provides in perti-
nent part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
rst amendment's religion clauses were made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establish-
ment clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause).
4. Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 999 (D. Minn. 1981), afl'd, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th
Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). The district court held that the statute
was neutral on its face and in its application, and that it did not have a primary
effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. The court also found no violation
of plaintiffs' free exercise rights. Mueller, 514 F. Supp. at 1003. This claim was
not raised on appeal.
5. Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1196, 1206 (8th Cir. 1982), aJT'd, 103 S. Ct. 3062
(1983).
6. The First Circuit had found a Rhode Island statute, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-
12(c)(2) (1980), almost identical to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09(22) (West Supp.
1983), unconstitutional under the establishment clause. Rhode Island Fed'n of
Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855, 857 (1st Cir. 1980).
7. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3064 (1983). The constitutionality of the text-
book and transportation deductions was considered to be settled by prior deci-
sions. Id. at 3070 n.10. But see id. at 3076-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
Mueller v. Allen
cuit's decision based on a determination that the statute had a secular
legislative purpose,8 a primary effect that neither advanced nor inhib-
ited religion,9 and did not foster excessive entanglement between gov-
ernment and religion.'°
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of aid to
nonpublic schools under the establishment clause in the 1947 case of
Everson v. Board of Education. " The Court approved a New Jersey
program that used tax-raised funds to reimburse parents for bus fares
paid to transport their children to public or private schools.' 2 The ma-
jority reasoned that although the establishment clause was intended to
erect a "wall of separation" between church and state prohibiting tax
funds from flowing to religious institutions, the free exercise clause pre-
cludes that state from denying its citizens the benefits of a general wel-
fare program because of their religious beliefs.' 3 The statute's purpose
was to provide safe and expeditious transportation for all commuting
school children, not to benefit sectarian schools. 14 While the statute
assisted church-related schools in facilitating attendance at these
schools, this benefit was deemed analogous to the incidental benefits
resulting from any general governmental service such as police and fire
protection.' 5 Moreover, bus transportation, like police and fire serv-
ices, was found clearly separate from the religious functions of sectar-
(Minnesota textbook-loan program distinguishable from the one previously ap-
proved, and tax deductions for instructional materials, encompassed within defini-
tion of "textbook," not supported by prior decisions).
8. Id at 3067.
9. Id. at 3067, 3071.
10. Id at 3071.
11. 330 U.S. 1, 29 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Note, Public Funds for Sectarian
Schools, 60 HARV. L. REV. 793, 793 (1947); Note, Constitutional Law--"The Law
Respecting an Establishment of Religion "--Statute Authorizing Use of School Dis-
trict Funds to Provide Transportation for Parochial School Children, 32 IowA L.
REV. 769, 770 (1947). While the Court has stated that the establishment clause
means at least that neither the state nor the federal government "can pass laws
which aid one religion, [or] aid all religions .... " Everson, 330 U.S. at 15, the
school aid cases, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 12-58, indicate that
not all aid flowing to religious institutions is forbidden. The boundaries of per-
missible assistance are influenced by what is perceived to be the proper relation-
ship between church and state, which in turn is determined by the purposes and
values underlying the establishment clause. See generally Freund, Public Aid to
Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969); Gianella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Nonestablishment
Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1968).
12. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
13. Id at 16. The first amendment requires a state "to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers." Id at 18. This concept of
neutrality, giving due deference to both the free exercise and establishment
clauses, is embodied in the primary effect test. See infra note 24 and accompany-
ing text.
14. Id at 18. The Everson Court noted that the schools received no state funds.
15. Id at 17-18.
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ian schools. 16
Relying in part on the "general welfare program" rationale of Ev-
erson, the Court in Board of Education v. Allen I7 found constitutional a
New York statute authorizing public schools to lend secular textbooks
to both public and private school children free of charge. 8 According
to the Court, the law merely provided books to nonpublic school chil-
dren as part of a general book-loan program,' 9 and thus was properly
neutral in its effect.2" As in Everson, the program's financial benefit was
viewed as accruing to parents and children,2' and in the majority's
opinion, the loan of secular textbooks did not aid the religious function
of sectarian schools.
22
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 23 the Court next reviewed the constitution-
ality of salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic
elementary schools. The Court noted that to avoid conflict with the es-
tablishment clause, a statute must meet a three-part test: first, the stat-
ute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and third, the
statute must not foster excessive governmental entanglement with reli-
gion.24 The statutes before the Court were found unconstitutional
under the third prong.
25
The lower courts in Lemon had determined that the vast majority
of nonpublic school teachers eligible for salary supplements were em-
ployed in sectarian schools with activities and purposes substantially
religious in nature.26 Therefore, the Court concluded that any attempt
to ensure that a teacher's services remained nonideological, as required
by the primary effect test, would necessarily involve the state in such
comprehensive and continuing surveillance of church-related schools
as to constitute excessive entanglement.27 The Lemon Court also noted
16. Id at 18. But see id at 47-49 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (payment for transporta-
tion is as essential to education as payment for tuition or teacher's salaries, and
these state expenditures made for religious school education are equally unconsti-
tutional under establishment clause).
17. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
18. Id. at 238.
19. Id. at 243.
20. See id.
21. Id at 243-44. The ownership of the books remained in the state and therefore no
funds or books went to the schools.
22. Id. at 244-45. But see id at 252-53 (Black, J., dissenting) (books can be used to
teach religious viewpoints and thus are distinguishable from bus rides, which are
nonideological in nature).
The majority's conclusion was based on the premise that sectarian schools
perform two separable functions-religious instruction and secular education-
and that aid can be restricted to the latter.
23. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
24. Id at 612-13.
25. Id. at 614. A statute must meet all three parts of the test to be found con-
stitutional.
26. Id. at 608, 610, 616, 620.
27. Id. at 619.
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that a teacher's services can include religious instruction. Thus, aid in
the form of salary supplements differs from secular, nonideological
assistance such as bus transportation and loan of secular textbooks.28
In addition to fatal administrative entanglements, the Lemon
Court identified a more broadly based entanglement in the form of
political divisiveness that these programs might engender. Providing
aid to religious schools that served a large number of the community's
school children would encourage partisans of this aid to use the polit-
ical processes to press ever-increasing demands for state assistance.
Opposition would develop, with resultant political division along reli-
gious lines. This result, the Court observed, is one of the principal evils
against which the establishment clause was intended to protect.29
Following Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court used principles and tests
developed in its prior decisions to review a variety of school aid pro-
grams,3" and invalidated many programs under the primary effect test.
Under this test, assistance provided to pervasively religious schools, or
assistance not restricted to the secular functions of a sectarian school,
has the primary effect of advancing religion.3' This result obtains
whether aid is provided directly to the schools themselves, or to par-
ents.32 Conversely, secular general welfare that cannot be diverted to
furthering a school's religious mission has been upheld. 33 Aid pro-
grams were also found invalid because the oversight necessary to en-
sure segregation of aid to permissible purposes would result in
28. Id. at 616-17.
29. Id at 622-23. But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1368-69 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (attempts to determine the potential political divisive-
ness inherent in a government practice are too speculative; entanglement prong
properly limited to administrative entanglement).
30. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (field trip transportation, in-
structional materials, and equipment); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (maintenance and repair grants); Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (reimburse-
ment for administering and grading state and teacher prepared tests).
31. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 253-54 (1977) (no guarantee field trips
would be used for only secular education); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363
(1975) (most assistance benefited schools of a predominately religious character);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(no assurance funds for maintenance and repair would be used only for secular
purposes); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472,
480 (1973) (no attempt to ensure teacher prepared tests would be used only for
secular purposes).
32. Compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977) (instructional materials
provided to pupils or parents) with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1975)
(instructional materials provided to schools).
33. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 655-
57 (1980) (reimbursements made to sectarian schools for testing services constitu-
tional since there was no substantial risk that examinations could be used for reli-
gious education purposes); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977) (speech,
hearing, and psychological diagnostic services could be provided by public school
personnel at sectarian schools since danger was minimal that contact with stu-
dents could be used for religious purposes).
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excessive entanglement between church and state.34
The constitutionality of tuition relief for parents of nonpublic
school children reached the Supreme Court in 1973 in Committee for
Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist. 35 The New York stat-
ute at issue provided partial tuition reimbursements and tuition tax de-
ductions for parents of nonpublic elementary and secondary school
children.36 Both forms of assistance were found unconstitutional as
having a primary effect that advanced religion.37
Since the majority of nonpublic schools in New York were church-
related,38 the statute in effect singled out parents of sectarian school
children for assistance. The Nyquist Court characterized the statute as
providing both financial support for religious schools39 and incentives
or rewards to parents sending their children to parochial schools."n A
further defect was found in the unrestricted nature of the tuition reim-
bursements since no effort had been made to guarantee that the aid
provided would support only the secular functions of the schools.4
The tuition reimbursement program was thus found distinguishable
from previously approved assistance because the program did not neu-
trally benefit parents of both public and nonpublic school children42
and because it was not carefully restricted to a school's secular
activities.43
While the tax relief provision was labeled a "deduction," the Ny-
quist Court stated that the provision operated more as a "credit"" cal-
culated to provide net benefits comparable to the tuition
34. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977) (excessive entanglement would
result from supervision of teachers during field trips).
35. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Lower courts have consistently struck down tuition aid to
parents of nonpublic school students, regardless of its form. See, e.g., Public
Funds for Pub. Schools of New Jersey v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.) (tax deduc-
tions), afl'd mem., 442 U.S. 907 (1979); Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers, AFL-
CIO v. Norberg, 479 F. Supp. 1364 (D.R.I. 1979) (tax deductions), aff'd, 630 F.2d
855 (1st Cir. 1980); Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Minnesota, 302 Minn. 216,
224 N.W.2d 344 (1974) (tax credits), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975); Kosydar v.
Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (tax credits), aff'd sub nom. Grit v.
Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio)
(grants), afl'd mem., 409 U.S. 808 (1972).
36. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 764
(1973).
37. Id at 798.
38. Id at 768.
39. Id at 783.
40. Id at 791.
41. Id at 783.
42. Id. at 782 n.38.
43. Id. at 782-83; accord Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1973).
44. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789
(1973). The tax benefit was in form similar to a deduction in that it was to be
subtracted from gross income prior to computation of tax due; a credit is deducted
from the amount of the tax owed. In effect, however, the tax benefit was found
more similar to a credit since the amount to be deducted "is not related to the
amount actually spent for tuition and is apparently designed to yield a predeter-
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reimbursements. 45 The "deduction" and the tuition reimbursements
were therefore subject to the same defects under the primary effect test,
and both had the impermissible effect of advancing religion.
46
In Mueller v. A//en 47 the Court addressed the question, left unan-
swered in Nyquist, of whether a "genuine tax deduction" for tuition
expenses would be found constitutional under the establishment
clause.48 Using a three-part test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,49
the majority readily found that the statute had a valid secular purpose5"
and caused no excessive entanglement between church and state.5' A
more difficult question was presented in regard to the statute's primary
effect.
In finding the tax deduction to have no impermissible effect, the
majority distinguished the New York law struck down in Nyquist.
While concededly having economic consequences similar to the tax
benefits disapproved in Nyquist, 52 the Minnesota statute provided for a
genuine tax deduction.53 More importantly, the statute in Nyquist lim-
ited assistance to parents of nonpublic school children, most of whom
attended sectarian schools. The Minnesota tax deductions were made
available to parents of both public and private school children, and
thus were analogous to the general welfare programs approved in Ever-
son and Allen. 14 The majority rejected the taxpayers' argument that
although the statute was facially broad and neutral in effect, it never-
theless primarily benefited religious institutions since tuition is the larg-
mined amount of tax 'forgiveness' in exchange for performing a specific act which
the State desires to encourage-the usual attribute of a tax credit." Id
45. Id at 790.
46. Id at 794.
47. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
48. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 790 n.49
(1973).
49. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
50. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066-67 (1983). This purpose was to ensure
both a well-educated citizenry and the continued vitality of private schools.
51. Id at 3071. The Minnesota statute entailed no greater administrative entangle-
ment than that existing in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The
"politically divisive" variant of the entanglement test was found inapplicable, be-
ing properly confined to those cases in which financial subsidies are paid directly
to parochial schools or to teachers in those schools. Id. at n. 11 (dictum).
52. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3067 n.6 (1983). While not calculated to provide
a carefully estimated net benefit, the Minnesota law does ensure each taxpayer
some financial benefit. Tax bills are reduced "by a sum equal to the amount of
tuition multiplied by [the taxpayer's] rate of tax." Id at 3072 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
53. Id at 3067 n.6. The Court in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), did not delineate the elements of a "genuine tax
deduction," but did give the example of deductions for charitable contributions.
Id at 790 n.49; see discussion supra note 44. The Minnesota deductions presuma-
bly would be "genuine" in that only actual expenditures were to be subtracted
from gross income, and the deductions, by the statute's language, were made
available to a broad group of beneficiaries.
54. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3068-69 (1983).
19841
Baltimore Law Review
est deductible expenditure, and since most of those eligible for tuition
deductions are parents of children attending sectarian schools." While
proponents of the statute had challenged the taxpayers' factual find-
ings,56 the majority refused to base its decision on resolution of these
factual conflicts, stating that the constitutionality of a facially neutral
law should not be made to hinge on statistics contained in annual re-
ports. Such a de facto approach would cause constitutional uncertainty
and would provide no principled standards for evaluation. Since the
Minnesota statute on its face benefited a broad class of parents, the
majority would not consider statistical data proving that this was not its
actual effect.57
The majority also found it significant that the direct beneficiaries
of the program were parents and not parochial schools. While conced-
ing that the ultimate economic effect of providing financial assistance
to parents is comparable to giving aid directly to the schools, the major-
ity felt that channeling assistance through parents attenuated the rela-
tionship between state financial assistance and religion. Funds reached
schools only as a result of private choices of individual parents as to
which schools their children would attend. The majority concluded
there was little chance that this attenuated relationship would lead to
the kind of political strife against which the establishment clause was
designed to protect, and therefore financial benefits flowing to sectarian
schools from such a relationship did not offend the Constitution.58
In evaluating the constitutionality of the Minnesota system of tax
deductions, the majority identified the determinative issue to be
whether this aid more closely resembled that struck down in Nyquist,
or those programs approved in cases such as Everson and Allen. " The
distinctions made and the analogies drawn, however, are subject to sev-
eral criticisms.
As the dissent in Mueller argued, the Minnesota statute is not sig-
nificantly distinguishable from the New York law struck down in Ny-
quist. No meaningful difference exists, in constitutional terms, between
a tax benefit labeled a "credit" and one denominated a "deduction"
because the economic consequences of the two benefits are concededly
hard to distinguish,6" and both programs are designed to yield tax ben-
55. Id. at 3070. Statistical data presented by the taxpayers indicated that 96% of chil-
dren enrolled in private schools attended church-related schools. Id Public
schools only charge tuition to students attending schools outside their regular
school districts. In the 1978-1979 school year, only 79 out of 815,079 children fell
into this category. Id at 3072 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. Id at 3070. Proponents of the tax benefit disagreed that public school tuition,
transportation, and textbook deductions were de minimis. They noted that the
categories of "textbooks" and "tuition" had been expanded, see id at 3065 n.2, to
include expenses that public school parents were likely to incur. Id at 3070.
57. Id at 3070.
58. Id at 3069.
59. Id. at 3066.
60. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Committee for Pub. Educ. &
[Vol. 13
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efits in exchange for making expenditures for sectarian school educa-
tion that the state wishes to encourage.6 Furthermore, the beneficiary
class in Mueller, like that in Nyquist, is composed predominately of
parents whose children attend church-related schools. 62 Thus, the ma-
jority's conclusion that the Minnesota tax statute is analogous to the
broad general welfare programs approved in Everson and Allen 63 seems
inaccurate.
Even assuming the existence of a true "general welfare statute,"
however, prior Court decisions indicate that the assistance provided by
the Minnesota law is unconstitutional. While not always logically con-
sistent,' these decisions indicate that only those programs providing
"secular, neutral, or nonideological services, facilities, or materials" to
sectarian schools will be found constitutional. 65 Furthermore, those
statutes upheld provided some effective means, not entailing excessive
entanglement, of ensuring that state aid was channeled only to the sec-
ular functions of sectarian schools and could not be diverted to reli-
gious purposes.
66
Clearly, assistance in the form of tuition subsidies is not, as the
majority contends, analogous to nonideological bus trips or secular
textbooks67 that are clearly "marked off from the religious function" of
sectarian schools. 61 Money derived from tuition payments form a ma-
jor part of a school's general budget 69 and can be used for religious
purposes as well as secular education. Hence, assistance flowing to pa-
rochial schools as a result of tuition subsidies to parents is not, and
Religious Freedom v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789-91 (1973) (impact of aid and not
its form is determinative of whether it is constitutional).
61. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3075-76 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. As Justice Marshall noted, there is no
need to resort to uncertain statistical data to determine whether the effect of the
statute is to benefit primarily parents of children attending religious schools, for
most other parents are "simply ineligible to obtain the full benefit of the deduc-
tion except in the unlikely event that they buy $700 worth of pencils, notebooks,
and bus rides for their school-age children." Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062,
3074 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3068-69 (1983).
64. For example, the distinctions drawn between impermissible instructional materi-
als, such as weather charts and globes, and permissible textbooks does not seem
logically tenable; both can be diverted to religious purposes. Compare Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (instructional material) with Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks). The Court has acknowledged that the lines of
demarcation between constitutional and unconstitutional forms of aid can only be
dimly perceived. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
65. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971).
66. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780
(1973).
67. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983). But see Wolman v. Essex, 342 F.
Supp. 399, 414 (S.D. Ohio) (money paid as tuition to parochial school is not neu-
tral or nonideological), afd mem., 409 U.S. 808 (1972).
68. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
69. Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 414 (S.D. Ohio), affid mem., 409 U.S. 808
(1972).
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cannot be, restricted to permissible uses without excessive entangle-
ment.7" The Court has consistently held that aid that is not subject to
guarantees of nonideological use is unconstitutional as an advancement
of religion.7 Moreover, the Court's past decisions do not support the
majority's view that otherwise impermissible aid will pass constitu-
tional muster by being channeled through parents.72
Finally, it seems untenable that the purposes underlying the estab-
lishment clause are not violated by the "attenuated financial benefits"
flowing to sectarian schools by operation of the Minnesota statute.73
While the risk of political divisiveness may be diminished by a statute
that benefits a truly broad-based class of recipients, this result does not
follow when a facially neutral statute in actuality provides assistance
along religious lines.7 4 Moreover, the danger of religious-political
strife is not necessarily diminished by providing aid indirectly to par-
ents, rather than directly to sectarian schools.7 5 In providing un-
restricted financial assistance to parents of sectarian school children,
and hence to the schools, the Minnesota statute also embodies one of
the primary evils against which the establishment clause was intended
to protect-financial support by the sovereign of religious activity.
76
The majority's decision in Aueller upholding assistance that is not
carefully restricted to secular purposes both departs from precedent
and is inconsistent with the purposes underlying the establishment
clause. Moreover, in refusing to look behind the Minnesota statute's
facial neutrality for its operative effect,7 7 the majority has rendered the
primary effect test largely meaningless. Since courts already generally
defer to legislative statements of secular purpose," the door now seems
70. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3076 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 414 (S.D. Ohio) (tuition tax benefits lack
effective means of ensuring that state aid will be used only for secular purposes),
afdmem., 409 U.S. 808 (1972).
71. See supra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
72. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069 (1983). But see Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 250 (1977) (it would "exalt form over substance" to hold that while
instructional materials may not constitutionally be provided directly to schools,
they may be provided to pupils or parents); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781-83 (1973) (tuition grants to parents
will not render constitutional a program providing otherwise impermissible aid);
School Dist. of Abington Township, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Douglas, J., con-
curring) ("What may not be done directly may not be done indirectly lest the
Establishment Clause become a mockery.").
73. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069 (1983).
74. See supra notes 55 & 62 and accompanying text.
75. See Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools. A Final Install-
ment, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 57, 95-96 ("allocations will be fought over no matter
the route they take to the sectarian institutions ..... Id at 96).
76. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
77. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
78. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983) (government assistance programs
consistently survive the secular legislative purpose inquiry).
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open for further tuition assistance,79 under the guise of facially neutral
statutes, for parents of parochial school children.
Judith D. Markoya
79. For example, proposed federal income tax credits for tuition expenses that are
now limited to parents of nonpublic school children, S. 528, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
129 CONG. REC. 1335-42 (1983), would probably pass constitutional muster if
broadened to include parents of public school students.
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